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ABSTRACT
The human rights abuses suffered by detainees held at Guantánamo
Bay have dominated many of the cases before the United Kingdom‟s
courts. The Human Rights Act of 1998, still relatively new to the statute
book, played a central role in the detainees‟ arguments. The ultimate
court decisions, however, often relegate such factors to the background
of the case. This article examines why the deciding courts declined to
develop the law of diplomatic protection on the basis of human rights
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concerns, and why such arguments continue to be employed by detainees. Furthermore, the article assesses why the English courts have
shown greater receptiveness to arguments similarly grounded in accusations of inhuman and degrading treatment in relation to later cases involving former detainees challenging the role of the British Government
in their detention.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the decade since the Human Rights Act1 came into force, incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)2 into the
domestic legal systems of the United Kingdom, the Convention rights
rapidly came to eclipse more established domestic sources of individual
rights against the state. Even before the Act came into force, Lord Hope,
one of the most senior appellate judges in the English legal system, recognized that “the incorporation of the European Convention on Human
Rights into our domestic law will subject the entire legal system to a
fundamental process of review and, where necessary, reform by the judiciary.”3 Few cases better illustrate the primacy of human rights discourse in English public law than those involving “detainees” held without trial by the United States government in the detention facility in
Guantánamo Bay. 4
After the United States invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, in the
wake of the 9/11 attacks against the United States, 5 facilities needed to be
1

Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). The Act became enforceable on October 2,

2000.
2
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
3
R v. Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene, [2000] 2 A.C. 326, 37475.
4
As Joseph Margulies points out, the term “detainee” was adopted by President
George W. Bush‟s Administration primarily as a means of avoiding suggestions that captured individuals were prisoners of war under the terms of the Third Geneva Convention.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135. See JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER 255 n.3 (2006). My use of this term in this article is not intended to add any
weight to this description of the individuals held at Guantánamo Bay, but rather accords
to the standard practice of the United Kingdom‟s courts in cases concerning these individuals. See also Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), http://dspace.wrlc.org/-doc/bitstream/2041/63447/00208.pdf.
5
Whilst the initial detainees held at Guantánamo Bay were captured in Afghanistan,
as the “war on terror” developed individuals were seized in countries across the world.
As Rosa Brooks recognized, this represented a breakdown of “[t]he distinction between
zones of war and zones of peace-between spatial areas in which the law of armed conflict
governs and spatial areas in which “ordinary” domestic law and international agreements
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found in which to hold and interrogate captured terrorist suspects.6 The
temporary Camp X-ray, a part of Guantánamo Bay‟s Naval Base initially
constructed to house Cuban and Haitian asylum seekers,7 was chosen to
receive these detainees in light of a Department of Justice assurance that
the site could be considered to fall outside the jurisdiction of the United
States‟ courts.8 In January 2002, the first detainees arrived. By April, all
detainees had been relocated to the permanent high-security structures of
Camp Delta, which had been hastily erected in the first few months of
2002.9
In the United Kingdom, reaction to the establishment of these
Camps was initially muted. Ministers assured Parliament that detainees
(including British citizens and resident foreign nationals) “are being
treated in line with international humanitarian norms, in conditions in
which security is paramount.”10 A ground swell of dissatisfaction only
began to develop with the realization that the United States Government
intended to hold these detainees for an extended period without trial or
judicial scrutiny. 11 In July 2003 the British Government dispatched Lord
govern.” Rosa E. Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law
of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 721 (2004). The global
scope of the “war on terror” was emphasized by the disparate locations where British citizens held at Guantánamo Bay were captured. See At-a-glance: Guantanamo Bay Britons, BBC NEWS, Mar. 9, 2004, http://-news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3089395.stm.
6
Ray Murphy affirms that under Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention such
interrogation would be lawful even if the United States‟ Government recognized captured
individuals as prisoners of war. However, Article 14(4) of the Convention prohibits physical or psychological maltreatment of prisoners. See Ray Murphy, Prisoner of War Status
and the Question of the Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 3 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 257, 273
(2003).
7
See Joint Taskforce Guantanamo: A historical look at Guantanamo Bay and the
Northeast Gate, http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/community/his-tory.html (last visited
Feb. 24, 2010).
8
See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, VISIT TO GUANTÁNAMO BAY, 2006-7, H.C. 44,
at
86,
available
at
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmfaff/44/44.pdf. Arguments that detainees would
therefore not be able to instigate habeas corpus claims subsequently failed before the Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), a case which involved British citizens Asif Iqbal and Shafiq Rasul and Australian citizen David Hicks, and which affirmed
that the US District Court for the District of Colombia did have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus cases brought by foreign national detainees held at Guantánamo Bay.
9
The Washington Post maintains a database of the names, nationalities and current
status of the 779 individuals who have at any point been held in the camps established at
Guantánamo Bay. As of January 2009, 198 detainees remain at Camp Delta. See The
Washington
Post,
Names
of
the
Detained,
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo/search/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
10
378 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2002) 623.
11
See Vikram Dodd, Waite: US at Guantanamo acts like my Beirut captors,
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Goldsmith, then the Attorney General, to express reservations regarding
the treatment of British detainees, and in particular, concerning the proposed system of Military Commissions. 12 Whilst Lord Goldsmith did secure a concession that British detainees would not be subject to the death
penalty,13 this “quiet diplomacy”14 could not continue once Lord Steyn
brought the British judiciary‟s abhorrence of the detentions at Camp Delta to the public‟s attention in his 2003 Mann Lecture. 15 He declared that
“[t]he purpose of holding the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay was and is to
put them beyond the rule of law, beyond the protection of any courts, and
at the mercy of the victors.”16 Moreover, he challenged the British Government “to make plain publicly and unambiguously our condemnation
of the utter lawlessness at Guantanamo Bay.”17 In the aftermath of this
devastating critique, the then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was obliged
to publically announce the United Kingdom‟s opposition to the Military
Commission process, on the basis that it “would not provide the process
that we would afford British nationals.”18
In 2005, the House of Lords 19 heard a case concerning whether the
British Government could rely upon evidence procured by torture conducted in a third state and in which the United Kingdom was not complicit.20 Maintaining the judicial pressure with regard to Guantánamo, Lord
Hope observed in his judgment that some of the practices authorized at
Camp Delta “would shock the conscience if they were ever to be autho-

GUARDIAN, Mar. 5, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/mar/05/humanrights.world.
12
See Press Release, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Attorney General to visit
Washington to discuss Guantanamo Bay Detainees (Jul. 18, 2003), available at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/press-release/2003/08/fco_npr_180703_attgenguantanamo.
13
As Lord Steyn archly observes, such differential treatment of British detainees
would have been openly discriminatory; “This gives a new dimension to the concept of
„most favoured nation‟ treatment in international law. How could it be morally defensible
to discriminate in this way between individual prisoners?” Johan Steyn, Guantánamo
Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT‟L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 9 (2004).
14
Baroness Scotland preferred to characterize these efforts as “robust diplomacy” in
parliamentary debates. 658 PARL. DEB., H.L. (6th ser.) (2004) 128.
15
Steyn, supra note 13.
16
Id. at 8.
17
Id. at 15.
18
418 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2004) 142.
19
At this time the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords was the highest domestic court in the English legal system. In October 2009, the jurisdiction of the House of
Lords was transferred to the newly constituted United Kingdom Supreme Court under
Constitutional Reform Act 2005. See Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 40 (Eng.).
20
A v. Sec‟y of State for the Home Dep‟t, [2005] UKHL 71 (Eng.).
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rized for use in our own country.” 21 In light of this sustained criticism,
and despite carefully choosing his words in repeated descriptions of
Guantánamo Bay as “an anomaly that has to be dealt with sooner or later”,22 in March 2006, then Prime Minister Tony Blair finally bowed to
pressure and asserted that it “would be better that it is closed.” 23
This article examines the importance of cases before the United
Kingdom‟s courts in influencing this longstanding judicial and executive
opposition to the United States‟ practice in Guantánamo Bay. These cases show the impact of the detentions in Guantánamo Bay rippling
through the English legal system. The key issue is the varying effectiveness of the decision by the detainees‟ legal representatives to focus their
arguments upon allegations that the United States‟ authorities had engaged in human rights abuses against their clients. Arguments by counsel regarding the maltreatment of these detainees not only amplified the
English judiciary‟s deep disquiet surrounding Guantánamo, bringing it to
the attention of the general public, but the prevailing public opinion fed
back into the tenor of the decisions of the courts.
The first substantive section of this article examines the decisions in
Abbasi v. Secretary of State24 and Al Rawi v. Secretary of State,25 in
which, respectively, the representatives of detained British citizens 26 and
foreign nationals ordinarily resident within the United Kingdom27 argued
that the British Government was obliged to exercise diplomatic protection by petitioning the United States for their release. The next section is
devoted to Secretary of State v. Hicks, 28 in which detained Australian citizen David Hicks argued that the courts should require the British Government to recognize his claim for British citizenship, in the belief that
Id., ¶ 126.
LIAISON COMMITTEE REPORT, 2005-6, H.C. 709-I, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmliaisn/709/5112201.htm.
23
Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Monthly Press Conference (Mar. 16, 2006), available
at http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9212.
24
R v. Sec‟y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA (Civ)
1598 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/20-02/1598.html
[hereinafter Abbasi].
25
R v. Sec‟y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2006] EWCA (Civ)
1279 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/20-06/1279.html
[hereinafter Al Rawi].
26
See Abbasi, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng.), ¶ 1.
27
See Al Rawi, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1279 (Eng.), ¶ 1.
28
Sec‟y of State for the Home Dep‟t v. Hicks, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 400 (Eng.),
available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/400.html [hereinafter
Hicks].
21
22
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the British Government would make more active efforts on his behalf
than the Australian Government had hitherto been willing to make. 29
Thereafter, the final section examines ongoing litigation in Binyan Mohamed v. Secretary of State30 and Al Rawi v. Security Service,31 where
the claimants seek to expose the role played by the British Government
in their detention.32 These cases continue to place the British Government in the invidious position of opposing the claims of individuals adversely affected by a detention regime which it had repudiated in order to
uphold its stated security policy and its international support for the
United States.
II. PLEADING FOR DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION
Feroz Abbasi, a British citizen, was captured by United States
forces during “Operation Enduring Freedom,” the military operations
that drove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. 33 In January 2002,
Abbasi was among the first prisoners to be transported to Guantánamo
Bay. With her son being detained arbitrarily, without access to a lawyer
or judicial process, Mrs. Abbasi instituted judicial review proceedings
before the English courts, arguing that they should compel the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to exert diplomatic pressure upon the
United States to remedy this situation. 34 The Court of Appeal condensed
the submissions of Abbasi‟s legal representative, Nicolas Blake, QC, to
the argument that:
Mr. Abbasi was subject to a violation by the United States of one of his
fundamental human rights and that, in these circumstances, the Foreign
Secretary owed him a duty under English public law to take positive steps
to redress the position, or at least to give a reasoned response to his request

Id. ¶ 1.
R v. Sec‟y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 2549 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2009/2549.html. [hereinafter Mohamed].
31
Al Rawi v. Security Serv., [2009] EWHC (QB) 2959 (Eng.), available at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2009/2959.html.
32
Id. ¶ 7.
33
Ahmed Rashid provides a thorough overview of Operation Enduring Freedom and
its aftermath, especially with regard to the efforts of the United States to capture members of Al Qaeda. See AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO CHAOS: THE UNITED STATES AND
THE F AILURE OF NATION BUILDING IN P AKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA
(2008).
34
This summary of facts is drawn from the judgment in Abbasi. See Abbasi, [2002]
EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng.), ¶¶ 3-8.
29
30
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for assistance.35

In assessing whether the treatment of British detainees in Camp
Delta engaged the United Kingdom‟s responsibilities under the ECHR,
the Court of Appeal first considered the principle established in Bertrand
Russell Peace Foundation v. United Kingdom.36 In this case, the European Commission of Human Rights rejected arguments that, “the Convention can … be interpreted so as to give rise to any obligation on the
Contracting Parties to secure that non-contracting states, acting within
their own jurisdiction, respect the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Convention.”37 Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has
confirmed that even the absolute prohibition of torture under the ECHR 38
does not oblige contracting states which are not causally connected to
such treatment to provide any civil remedy for individuals subjected to
torture by a third state.39 In light of these authorities Lord Phillips, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, emphasized the following facts:
“The United States Government is not before the court, and no order of
this court would be binding upon it. Conversely, the United Kingdom
Government, which, through the Secretaries of State is the respondent to
these proceedings, has no direct responsibility for the detention.”40
The Court of Appeal therefore concluded that, “we do not consider
that the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights
Act afford any support to the contention that the Foreign Secretary owes
Mr. Abbasi a duty to exercise diplomacy on his behalf.”41 Nevertheless,
the Court did consider the impact of the Government‟s policy statements
regarding diplomatic assistance, 42 as these “indicate a clear acceptance
Id. ¶ 25. Article 5 of the ECHR provides that “everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person.” ECHR, supra note 2.
36
Bertrand Russell Peace Found. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7597/76, 14 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 117 (1978).
37
Id. at 124.
38
Article 3 of the ECHR provides that “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” ECHR, supra note 2, art. 3.
39
See Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11, ¶¶
38-41 (2002).
40
Abbasi, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng.), ¶ 67.
41
Id. ¶ 79.
42
Most significantly, the ministerial policy statement in LXX BRITISH
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 526, 528 (1999):
At present we consider making representations if, when all legal remedies have
been exhausted, the British national and their lawyer have evidence of a miscarriage or denial of justice. We are extending this to cases where fundamental violations of the British national‟s human rights had demonstrably altered the course of
35
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by the government of a role in relation to protecting the rights of British
citizens abroad, where there is evidence of miscarriage or denial of justice.”43 Whilst he acknowledged that these statements “contain no more
than a commitment „to consider‟ making representations, which will be
triggered by the “belief” that there is a breach of the international obligations,”44 Lord Phillips employed them as the basis of a legitimate expectation on the part of the British citizens that the Government will act in
accordance with this stated policy:
[The FCO] has indicated … what a British citizen may expect of it. The
expectations are limited and the discretion is a very wide one but there is no
reason why its decision or inaction should not be reviewable if it can be
shown that the same were irrational or contrary to legitimate expectation.45

The Court of Appeal‟s recognition that the government‟s pronouncements could constrain its discretion allowed it to review the use of
the “prerogative power” to afford diplomatic protection. 46 Lord Phillips‟
cautious tone nonetheless underlines the precariousness of the Court of
Appeal‟s jurisdiction in this field. Whilst the prerogative was accepted
as being generally reviewable in the CCSU case,47 in that decision Lord
Fraser had emphasized that “[m]any of the most important prerogative
powers … are concerned with control of the armed forces and with foreign policy and with other matters which are unsuitable for discussion or
review in the law courts.”48
The Abbasi decision, in advancing judicial review into the arena of
diplomatic relations, seemingly trespassed into the „forbidden‟ 49 area of
foreign policy matters which had so concerned Lord Fraser. In reality,
not all foreign policy matters are closed to the United Kingdom‟s courts.
Judges rapidly circumscribed this barrier to judicial review, with Lord
justice. In such cases, we would consider supporting their request for an appeal to
any official human rights body in the country concerned, and subsequently giving
advice on how to take their cases to relevant international human rights mechanisms.
43
Abbasi, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng.), ¶ 92.
44
Id.
45
Id. ¶ 106.
46
Blackburn explains that, “[t]he Crown „Prerogative‟ . . . is the term used to describe the network of inherent common law powers, privileges and immunities of the
Crown which have existed since time immemorial and exist by virtue of past de facto
judicial recognition. R. Blackburn, Monarchy and the Personal Prerogatives, [2004] Pub.
L. 546, 547-48 (Eng.).
47
Council for Civil Serv. Union v. Minister for the Civil Serv., [1985] A.C. 374,
(Eng.).
48
Id. at 398.
49
Abbasi, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng.), ¶ 106.
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Justice Richards conceding extra-judicially that “recent cases show that
the forbidden areas of foreign policy and the like are much narrower than
one might have thought, and that the CCSU case has opened up very
considerable scope for judicial review in these fields.” 50
One key decision is ex parte Everett, in which Lord Justice Taylor
asserted that the provision of passports was not an unreviewable question
of „high policy‟, but rather “a matter of administrative decision, affecting
the rights of individuals and their freedom of travel.”51 This distinction
was seized upon by Lord Phillips in recognizing Abbasi‟s procedural legitimate expectations;
The Secretary of State must be free to give full weight to foreign policy
considerations, which are not justiciable. However, that does not mean the
whole process is immune from judicial scrutiny. The citizen‟s legitimate
expectation is that his request will be “considered”, and that in that consideration all relevant factors will be thrown into the balance.52

The Court of Appeal thus accepted that it was for the Foreign Secretary to decide whether to assist a citizen facing abuses of process overseas,53 but refused to allow the Minister to make this decision “unless
and until he has formed some judgment as to the gravity of the miscarriage.”54 This position can be compared to the recognition by the United
States Supreme Court that where the United States‟ Government expressed concerns that a case might undermine aspects of foreign policy
the Court would, on a case-by-case basis, assess whether the gravity of
such concerns warranted the dismissal of the law suit.55 In the instant
case, however, the British Government had not been inactive with regards to Abbasi‟s request. Not only had the request been considered, but
FCO officials confirmed to the court that “the British detainees are the
subject of discussions between this country and the United States both at

50
Lord Justice Richards, Gray‟s Inn Reading at Gresham College: The International
Dimension of Judicial
Review (Jun.
7,
2006), available at
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications_media/speeches/2006/sp070606.htm.
51
R. v. Sec‟y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Everett
[1988]
EWCA
(Civ)
7
(Eng.),
available
at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1988/7.html.
52
Abbasi, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng.), ¶ 99.
53
Lord Phillips accepted that international law places no obligation upon states “to
intervene by diplomatic or other means to protect a citizen who is suffering or threatened
with injury in a foreign State.” Id. ¶ 69.
54
Id. ¶ 100.
55
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
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Secretary of State and lower official levels.” 56 The court accepted that
such activity on Abbasi‟s behalf was sufficient to fulfill his legitimate
expectations and refused to require that specific representations should
be made to the United States Government. 57
A year after the decision in Abbasi, political pressure, rather than a
court order, compelled then Prime Minister Tony Blair to broach the subject of the return of British citizens held at Camp Delta in discussions
with President George W. Bush while in London. 58 By January 2005,
these representations had helped to secure the release of all British citizens.59 At this time, however, no representations were made in relation
to Guantánamo detainees who, whilst not British citizens, had been
granted leave to remain in the United Kingdom prior to their detention. 60
This differentiated treatment was explained on the basis that “the Government [is] not in a position to provide diplomatic protection or consular assistance to foreign nationals.”61
Undaunted, three refugees, who prior to their detention had been accepted as permanent residents of the United Kingdom, launched a judicial review of the government‟s failure to make representations on their
behalf. Bisher Al Rawi, an Iraqi national, came to the United Kingdom
in 1983, whilst Jamil El Banna, a Jordanian national, arrived just over a
decade later in 1994. They were detained upon entry to the Gambia in
November 2002, on the basis of suspected links to international terrorism. In early 2003, Gambian officials transferred these individuals into
the control of the American military. The third claimant, Omar Deghayes, a Libyan national, was detained by the Pakistani authorities in
April 2002, before being handed over to United States forces. The
Abbasi, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng), ¶ 107.
Id.
58
Sarah Baxter, Guantanamo Bay Britons set for Christmas return, TIMESONLINE
(London),
Nov.
30,
2003,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article1030164.ece.
59
Jack Straw, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 429
PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 173. On January 25, 2005, Feroz Abbasi was, amongst
the last four British detainees (together with Martin Mubanga, Richard Belmar, and
Moazzam Begg) to be transferred by the United States authorities to the custody of the
United Kingdom.
60
This status is provided for under Immigration Act, 1971, c. 77 § 3(1)(b) (Eng.),
under which a foreign national “may be given leave to enter the United Kingdom (or,
when already there, leave to remain in the United Kingdom) either for a limited or for an
indefinite period.” Where an individual has indefinite leave to remain in the United
Kingdom her status is roughly equivalent to individuals who are Lawful Permanent Residents of the United States (“green card” holders).
61
Lord Triesman, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 685 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 992.
56
57
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United States declared the three men to be enemy combatants and all
were subsequently transferred to Guantánamo Bay, where they were detained and interrogated. 62
With the possibility of these men seeking protection from the countries that they had fled as refugees providing cold comfort in the cells of
Guantánamo, they argued that the British Government‟s refusal to assist
them, when it had successfully petitioned for the release of British citizens, constituted discrimination on the basis of nationality. 63 Moreover,
whereas the claim in Abbasi focused on arbitrary detention, the claimants
in Al Rawi argued that their case was more compelling on the basis of
their allegations that they had suffered torture at the hands of the United
States authorities. 64
In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Laws considered that whether
the British Government‟s policy of drawing a distinction between British
citizens and permanent residents in the provision of diplomatic protection amounted to discrimination depended upon an exploration of why
such contrasting treatment had occurred,65
[I]t may be said there are two possible answers: (1) because they were not
British nationals - as the appellants say; (2) because they were not persons
whom the United Kingdom was by the rules of international law entitled to
protect by means of a State to State claim - as the respondents say. Each
answer is in a sense true. By what principle do we decide between them?66

Answering this question turned upon an assessment of whether nationals and resident foreign nationals where actually „materially different‟67 groups for the purpose of diplomatic protection, permitting differential treatment under the Race Relations Act:
The national and the non-national are in truth in materially different cases
one from the other for the purpose of the exercise of the right of diplomatic
protection by means of State to State claims. … The non-nationals have
been treated differently from the nationals not because of their race (natio-

62

This summary of facts is drawn from the first instance judgment in the Al Rawi
case, R. v. Sec‟y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2006] EWHC (Admin)
972, ¶¶ 3-13 [hereinafter Al Rawi (Divisional Court)].
63
Race Relations Act 1976, c. 74, §§ 1(1)(a), 19B(1), (Eng.).
64
See Al Rawi, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1279 (Eng.), ¶ 16.
65
See R. v. Immigration Officer, Prague Airport [2004] UKHL 55, (Eng.) (establishing the basis for this test).
66
Al Rawi, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1279 (Eng.), ¶ 75.
67
Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, (Eng.) § 3(4).
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nality) but because one group is entitled to diplomatic protection and the
other is not.68

Lord Justice Laws therefore ruled that the claimants would have to
establish that the Foreign Secretary‟s decision to deny foreign nationals
diplomatic protection “is frankly perverse,” an endeavor which was “manifestly unachievable”69 on the basis of arguments that they had been
subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. The Court of Appeal accepted, as it had in Abbasi, that regardless of the gravity of the infringement of an individual‟s human rights, “the ECHR contains no requirement that a signatory State should take up the complaints of any
individual within its territory touching the acts of another sovereign
State.”70 As the Divisional Court, which first heard the claim, inevitably
asserted, “the powerful submissions made on behalf of the claimants
founder, perhaps uncomfortably and unsatisfactorily, on the rock which
prevented the Abbasi claim from succeeding.”71 As in Abbasi, such arguments failed to address the British government‟s contention that the
United Kingdom owed no duty to provide diplomatic protection to the
world at large.72 Therefore, whilst Lord Justice Laws did accept that
“[t]he prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, some of them at least, have suffered
grave privations,73 this acknowledgement was worth little when British
government did not dispute that the detainees had been „subjected at least
to inhuman and degrading treatment,”74 but the claimants could not link
the British government to those abuses.
The rejection of the appeal by British resident detainees in Al Rawi
closed the legal avenues by which they could pursue diplomatic protection. Over the course of the next year, however, with political pressure
on the British government to act on the detainees‟ behalf mounting as a
result of the attention brought to their plight by this case, 75 Sadat Sayeed
foresaw that “their fate will be determined by the outcome of ongoing
Anglo-US diplomacy.”76 The focus of these cases upon the detainees‟
treatment, a strategy which delivered “strong arguments in the context of
Al Rawi, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1279 (Eng.), ¶ 78.
Id. ¶ 141.
70
Id. ¶ 102.
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Al Rawi (Divisional Court), [2006] EWHC (Admin) 972, ¶ 96.
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Al Rawi, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1279 (Eng.), ¶ 102.
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Id. ¶ 3.
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Id.
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See Vikram Dodd, Tortuous path out of prison for Guantánamo 3, GUARDIAN,
Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/dec/20/-usa.world.
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Sadat Sayeed, Guantanamo Bay – Five Years On, 21 J. IMMIGR. ASYLUM &
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political debate,”77 goes a long way towards explaining this change in the
British Government‟s position. As Philippe Sands, QC, once junior
counsel in Abbasi, explains with regard to that case:
The Court‟s judgment added great authority to those who were relying on
international law to challenge the conditions of the Guantánamo detainees.
… To a significant extent the judgement of the Court of Appeal has set the
tone for British public opinion on the issue of Guantánamo. 78

The most prominent example of the impact of the claims was Lord
Steyn‟s famous excoriation of Guantánamo Bay as “a legal black hole,” 79
which can be traced directly to the submissions of counsel for the claimants in Abbasi, Mr. Nicholas Blake QC.80 Furthermore, the Divisional
Court‟s decision in Al Rawi even prompted Parliament‟s Joint Committee on Human Rights to review the cooperation of the United Kingdom‟s
security service with the United States. 81 Therefore, despite the courts‟
refusal to intervene, the claimants‟ assertions of arbitrary detention and
torture became embedded in the public consciousness in the United
Kingdom. In August 2007, an eventual effort on the part of the British
government in response to this mounting public pressure, 82 coupled with
the eagerness of the Bush Administration to lessen the burden of Camp
Delta, ultimately resulted in the release of most of the United Kingdom
residents, including all of the claimants who had called upon the United
Kingdom‟s protection in Al Rawi.83
If the legal representatives for Abbasi and Al Rawi can be accused
of playing to the gallery, Lord Phillips‟ judgment in Abbasi attempted the
more audacious feat of influencing the Federal courts of the United
States,84 which were at the time, engaged in hearing Rasul v. Bush,85 the
Al Rawi (Divisional Court), [2006] EWHC (Admin) 972, ¶ 89.
Philippe Sands, The “Political” and the “Legal:” Comments of Professor Tushnet’s Paper, 3 INT‟L J. L. IN CONTEXT 319, 322 (2007).
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Steyn, supra note 13, at 1.
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See J OINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, NINETEENTH REPORT, THE UN
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE (UNCAT) REPORT, 2005-6, H.L. 185-I, H.C. 701-I, ¶
57.
82
See Press Release, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Guantanamo Bay: Former
UK
Residents
(Aug.
6,
2007),
http://www.fco.gov.uk/re-sources/en/pressrelease/2007/08/fco_hp_npr_070807_guantbayukres (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
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Jamie Doward, Guantanamo Britons could now face control orders, THE
OBSERVER, Dec. 9, 2007, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/dec/09/guantanamo.usa/print.
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See T. Poole, Harnessing the Power of the Past? Lord Hoffmann and the Belmarsh Detainees Case, 32 J.L. & SOC‟Y 534, 550 (2005).
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conjoined habeas corpus actions involving British citizens. Nonetheless,
as Matthew Happold asserts, “[f]or a transnational judicial conversation
to happen ... there needs be at least two parties to the discussion,” 86 and
the lack of reference to Abbasi in the habeas corpus judgments of either
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals 87 or Supreme Court
seemingly supports contention that these overtures fell on deaf ears.
Lord Phillip‟s judgment was, however, brought to the attention of the
Supreme Court in several amici curiae briefs, 88 which focused in particular upon his acknowledgement that “[t]he United Kingdom and the United States share a great legal tradition, founded in the English common
law. One of the cornerstones of that tradition is the ancient writ of habeas corpus.”89 This language is paralleled in the majority opinion by
Justice Stevens and it is conceivable that it may have influenced the
court‟s extensive consideration of eighteenth century English authorities.90
III. AN UNEXPECTED CLAIM OF CITIZENSHIP
The British government‟s success in securing the release of British detainees had an unexpected side-effect. It prompted fellow detainee
David Hicks to apply for British citizenship. Hicks, an Australian citizen, was seized by Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan in December
2001 and transferred to Guantánamo Bay a month later. In the two years
preceding his capture, Hicks had, by his own admission, “undergone extensive general and terrorist training, at camps with links to or belonging
to Al Qaida‟,” activities which, according to the then Home Secretary
Charles Clarke, were “seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the
United Kingdom and which demonstrate disaffection with Her Majesty
and the United Kingdom.”91
85
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Matthew Happold, The Detention of Al-Qaeda Suspects at Guantanamo Bay:
United Kingdom Perspectives, 4 HUM. RTS L. REV. 57, 68 (2004).
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Hicks, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 400 (Eng.), ¶ 5).
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In light of Hicks‟ conduct, the Australian Government had not actively pursued his repatriation with the United States. After nearly four
years in Guantánamo he was to be tried before a military commission on
a number of charges,92 including allegations that he was responsible for
translating training manuals into English. 93 He therefore sought to qualify for British citizenship, on the basis of his mother‟s birth in the United
Kingdom, 94 in the expectation that he would be treated in the same way
as the nine British citizens who had been released and who had not faced
charges when they returned to the United Kingdom.
In response, the then Home Secretary informed Hicks that he would,
using his powers under the British Nationality Act of 1981, immediately
revoke any citizenship that he was obliged to grant,95 on the basis that
Hicks‟ actions had been “seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the
UK.”96 The power to revoke citizenship on this basis, however, was not
enacted until a 2002 amendment to the Act, 97 post-dating Hicks‟ activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Therefore, the original wording of section 40 of the British Nationality Act of 1981 still applied, and this required the Home Secretary to establish that Hicks had “shown himself by
act or speech to be disloyal or disaffected towards Her Majesty”98 before
he could be deprived of his citizenship.
The conditions in which Hicks was being held again loomed large
in the case. In perhaps the most reserved language used by a British
judge in describing Camp Delta, Mr. Justice Collins recognized the im92

The then Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, declared at a Press Conference
at the Pentagon that, “Australia is satisfied that the military commission process in relation to David Hicks, as he is the one Australian held in Guantanamo Bay, will provide a
proper measure of justice.” United States Department of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld
Media Availability with Australian Prime Minister John Howard, Jan. 10, 2010,
http://www.def-ense.gov/transcripts/tran-script.aspx?transcriptid=3182.
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as established on the order of President George W. Bush violated international law and
the law of the United States. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002).
This ruling prompted Congress to pass the Military Commissions Act 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
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British Nationality Act 1981, c. 61, § 4C (Eng.), inserted into the Act by the Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002, c. 13, § 13(1).
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Letter from the Secretary of State to David Hicks (Nov. 9, 2005) (reproduced in
Hicks, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 400 (Eng.), ¶ 3).
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portance of expediting the case on the basis that “the claimant is held in
what are no doubt far from pleasant conditions.” 99 The case, however,
turned on the substantive question of whether Hicks‟ activities before he
was granted citizenship could form the basis of a justification for revoking it, with the British Government contending that “[d]isloyalty and disaffection may be shown without allegiance as a citizen being owed.”100
Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal accepted that Hicks
had a right to be registered as a British citizen and rejected the government‟s argument that citizenship thereby granted could be revoked due to
disaffection and disloyalty evidenced by his past actions.101 According
to Pill LJ,
[T]he word “disaffected” as well as the word “disloyal” requires an attitude
of mind towards an entity to which allegiance is owed, or at least to which
the person belongs or is attached. . . . To be disaffected is to be estranged
in affection towards an entity to which one owes allegiance or with which
one has at least a relationship. The word is not apt to cover, in relation to
the United Kingdom, an outsider, whether a German general during the 1st
World War, or an Australian in Afghanistan in 1990.102

As a result of this ruling, Hicks had to be registered as a British citizen, with citizenship being granted on July 7, 2006. In the preceding
months, however, the British government had worked assiduously to secure the passage through Parliament of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act of 2006. This Act permitted the removal of citizenship
from dual nationals, such as Hicks, on the broad basis that “the Secretary
of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good.” 103
Basing this new power to deprive citizenship on the Home Secretary‟s
subjective opinion of the threat posed by an individual allowed John
Reid, Charles Clarke‟s successor as Home Secretary, to take account of
Hick‟s conduct prior to his receiving citizenship.
This measure constitutes the most egregious displays of “personalized” legislation to be enacted in the United Kingdom in recent years,104
99

(Eng.).

R. v. Sec‟y of State for the Home Depart. [2005] EWHC (Admin) 2818, ¶ 1

Hicks, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 400 (Eng.), ¶ 23.
Id. ¶ 37.
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specifically to prevent the flamboyant trade union leader Arthur Scargill from being ap100
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having received its Royal Assent more than three months after the High
Court had ruled in Hicks‟ favor and having only come into force in June
2006. Given that legislation already provided for the revocation of citizenship of any dual national who could be shown, since 2002, to have
acted in a manner “seriously prejudicial” to the United Kingdom‟s vital
interests,105 Hicks can be seen as virtually the only individual against
whom such extended powers were necessary. Such machinations were
of doubtful worth when it is considered that in his judgment, Lord Justice
Pill had taken great care to acknowledge that Hicks enjoyed much weaker links to the United Kingdom than other British-citizen detainees, and
therefore that “the Secretary of State, in the exercise of his discretion, is
entitled to distinguish between the respondent and other British citizens
at Guantanamo Bay.”106 Had the Government followed this course of action, Hick‟s claims would at least have received proper consideration,
even if they were ultimately rejected. Instead, a matter of hours after
Hicks was granted British citizenship, the status was revoked using the
new statutory powers.107
The Hicks case highlights the paradox inherent in the approach of
Tony Blair‟s Administration to Guantánamo Bay. Ministers may have
been willing to criticize the operation of Camp Delta to a domestic audience, and the government was eventually moved to tackle domestic
criticism by pursuing the release of both British citizens and residents.
However, the Government has eschewed actions which would embarrass
other governments, even to the point of drafting the specific “get-Hicks”
provision to defeat his citizenship claims. Klein and Barry note that “[i]n
stripping Hicks of his British nationality and refusing to take action on
his behalf, it is arguable that the United Kingdom has shown some deference to the position of Australia in its treatment of Hicks.” 108 Nonetheless, as they go on to argue, Hicks‟ dual nationality “could have been
viewed as an increased opportunity to protect Hicks‟s human rights, rather than as another reason to deny assistance.” 109
Charges were brought against Hicks under the revised Military
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Commission process in February 2007,110 but his high-profile battle for
citizenship in the English courts highlighted just how little the Australian
government had done on his behalf. Amid intense public pressure in
Australia, the convening authority appointed under the United States
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Judge Susan Crawford, accepted a
pre-trial agreement with Hick‟s lawyers. He was allowed to serve the
remaining months of his sentence in an Australian prison. 111
IV. REVEALING A JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE?
At the end of George W. Bush‟s presidency, only two former British residents remained in detention at Guantánamo. In the case of one of
the men, Shaker Aamer, the United States expressed such serious objections to his release that in December 2007 the Foreign Secretary had to
acknowledge that “we are no longer in active discussions regarding his
transfer to the UK.”112 The other detainee, Binyan Mohamed, an Ethiopian national, had been granted exceptional leave to remain in the United
Kingdom in 2000. Held in United States custody since his arrest in Pakistan on April 10, 2002, Mohamed alleges that he was subjected to repeated torture. On May 28, 2008, he was charged under the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 with offences relating to his alleged involvement in planning terrorist attacks, particularly the so-called “dirty bomb
plot,” against the United States.113
Whilst the British Government pressed for Mohamed‟s release
alongside the other British residents, 114 it refused to make public potentially exculpatory evidence and accounts of his treatment received
through intelligence sharing with the United States Government. 115 This
110

See Press Release, Alexander Downer, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Phillip
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Secretary to assist [Mohamed].” Id. ¶ 55.
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The Divisional Court quoted at length from a letter between the British government and Mohamed‟s legal team which explained the nature of the material held by the
government; “The Government has previously said to you ... that it had no information to
confirm Binyan Mohamed‟s account of his detention following his arrest in Pakistan or
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assertion of “public interest immunity,” a doctrine in the United Kingdom‟s public law which is intended to maintain the secrecy of important
documents, particularly where there are security implications in their release, was initially upheld by the Divisional Court.116 Indeed, the first
judgment in Mohamed was much more reticent about the claimant‟s assertions of ill treatment than previous courts had been when deciding
upon cases involving Guantánamo detainees. Lord Justice Thomas noted
that “we are satisfied that there is only the slenderest evidence independent of [Mohamed] to support his case of torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment by the United States authorities.”117
This acknowledgement that the protected documents included some
evidence supporting Mohamed‟s claims that he had been tortured remained significant. On the basis of closed evidence presented by a
member of the United Kingdom‟s Security Services, Witness B, the Divisional Court accepted that “[t]he [Security Services] continued to facilitate the interviewing of [Mohamed] by providing information and questions … in the knowledge of what had been reported to them in relation
to the conditions of his detention and treatment,” and they continued to
do so “when they must also have appreciated that he was not in a United
States facility and that the facility in which he was being detained and
questioned was that of a foreign government.”118 Lord Justice Thomas
concluded that “the relationship of the United Kingdom Government to
the United States authorities in connection with [Mohamed] was far
beyond that of a bystander or witness to the alleged wrongdoing.”119
Several judgments later, Mohamed still did have access to the
documents that he originally sought.120 New fuel was provided for the
his allegations of mistreatment while in detention. In the light of your correspondence
and the related judicial review proceedings, all the various branches of the Government
have recently undertaken a further review of the material held on their files. In the course
of this review, some limited additional material was discovered. While this material may
not have a bearing on the charges preferred against Binyan Mohamed, and may not be
definitive, it is possible that it could be considered to be exculpatory or might otherwise
be relevant under [the Military Commissions Act] and the accompanying provisions of
the Manual for Military Commissions.” Id. ¶ 47.
116
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and the redaction of passages from the High Court‟s judgments, in light of concerns that
the release of such information would jeopardize the intelligence sharing between the
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litigation in January 2009 when Judge Susan Crawford, the Convening
Authority for Military Commissions, revealed in an interview that she
had refused to refer the charges against Mohammed al-Qahtani, a Saudi
national held at Guantánamo Bay, to a military commission on the basis
that he had been tortured.121
Placing emphasis on Judge Crawford‟s comments, 122 the judges
hearing Mohamed continued to reflect the “deep concern” 123 for the
treatment of Guantánamo detainees which had prevailed in the courts
since Abbasi. In their fourth judgment in the case, delivered just prior to
Mohamed‟s release, they asserted the importance of making this evidence public given the subject matter it concerned,
If the redacted passages containing a gist of what was reported by officials
of the United States Government were made public that would enable more
informed and accurate public debate to take place and Governments to be
held to account. The fact that the issues raised relate to torture and cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment have a particular resonance …124

Moreover, they affirmed that some of the substance of the redacted
paragraphs amounted to “a short summary of what was reported to the
United Kingdom authorities by the officials of the United States Government as to what they say happened to [Mohamed] during his detention in Pakistan in April and May 2002.”125 Following the lead of the
Court of Appeal judgment in Abbasi, the Divisional Court sought to extend its influence to decision makers in the United States. Emphasizing
“the long history of the common law and democracy which we share
with the United States”, Lord Justice Thomas asserted that it was,
[I]n our view difficult to conceive that a democratically elected and accountable government could possibly have any rational objection to placing
into the public domain such a summary of what its own officials reported
as to how a detainee was treated by them and which made no disclosure of
sensitive intelligence matters.126

United Kingdom and the United States, is beyond the scope of this article. The basis of
such a claim by the British Government can be found in Viscount Simon LC‟s conclusion
that, “documents otherwise relevant and liable to production must not be produced if the
public interest requires that they should be withheld.” Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co.,
[1942] A.C. 624, 636, (Eng).
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Although these comments did not have their intended effect, in that
the United States Government released no new information, the controversy generated by Divisional Court‟s decision directly contributed to
Mohamed‟s release. The day after its fourth decision was issued, the
British Government was obliged to acknowledge that “[w]e continue to
press for Mr. Mohamed‟s return from Guantanamo as vigorously as before.”127 One week later, following renewed contact between senior officials in the wake of these comments, the British Government further confirmed that the United States Administration had agreed that “Mr.
Mohamed‟s case should be treated as a priority.” 128 Eleven days after
this statement, Binyan Mohamed was released. 129
The case, however, continued after this dramatic turn of events, 130
with Binyan Mohamed‟s legal representatives seeking to expose evidence of the United Kingdom‟s collusion in the alleged torture, which
took place whilst he was within the custody of the United States. The
allegations brought to light by the case were so serious that the Attorney
General has referred them to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police for a criminal investigation against Security Service personnel,
which commenced in July 2009.131 Furthermore, the Divisional Court‟s
fifth judgment, in October 2009, has since ordered that the information
contained in the redacted paragraphs of its earlier decision must be restored. 132 At the center of any future criminal action will be the conduct
of Witness B, the member of the Security Services who interviewed Mohamed whilst he was detained in Karachi, Pakistan, under the control of
the United States, after his arrest in April 2002. The investigation will
focus on complicity in the offense of torture contained in the Criminal
127
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Justice Act of 1988.133 English criminal law also establishes that it is an
offence for a public official of the United Kingdom to act, whilst overseas, in a manner which would constitute an indictable offence if done in
the United Kingdom. 134 Analyzing international authorities on what
conduct constitutes complicity in relation to torture under the UN Torture
Convention,135 Parliament‟s joint Human Rights Committee recently asserted that:
“[F]or the purposes of individual criminal responsibility for complicity in
torture, “complicity” requires proof of three elements: (1) knowledge that
torture is taking place, (2) a direct contribution by way of assistance that (3)
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”136

This interpretation of the offense of torture would suggest that, in
taking part in interviews and providing information for use in interrogations, officials such as Witness B would have been complicit in torture if
they knew that such mistreatment of detainees was taking place. Even if
criminal charges do not result, this does not preclude state responsibility
for torture, should the publication of information required by the Divisional Court in Mohamed reveal the United Kingdom‟s collusion in activities is incompatible with the Article 3 ECHR prohibition of torture. 137
Indeed, had such evidence been available to the claimants in Al Rawi, the
Court of Appeal could not have side-stepped questions concerning the
extra-territorial effect of the ECHR.138
Whilst serving as British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown continued
to argue that the ECHR does not include “a positive legal obligation to
report or seek to prevent acts of torture carried out by other states
abroad.”139 Nonetheless, it is clear that where a state is complicit in
133
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134
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another state‟s torture of an individual, this will be actionable. The type
of collusion which has been dealt with most frequently by the European
Court of Human Rights has involved efforts by parties to the ECHR to
extradite individuals to states where they were at risk of such treatment.
In Saadi v. Italy the Court held that “[s]ince protection against the treatment prohibited by Article 3 is absolute, that provision imposes an obligation not to extradite or expel any person who, in the receiving country,
would run the real risk of being subjected to such treatment.”140
That the concept of state complicity in torture under the ECHR extends beyond extradition to a state which practices torture can be seen in
other decisions, such as Al Adsani, where the claimant‟s action against
the United Kingdom for failing to stop his torture by the Kuwaiti authorities was rejected, but only because “[t]he applicant does not contend that
the alleged torture took place within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or that the United Kingdom authorities had any causal connection
with its occurrence.”141
Moreover, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal has recently ruled,
in a case involving Canadian officials sharing with the United States‟ authorities the details of an interview with a Guantánamo detainee, that
such activities amounted to a breach of the detainee‟s right to liberty under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.142 Taken
together these authorities indicate that the United Kingdom‟s involvement or collusion in the detention of an individual in Guantánamo could
constitute an actionable breach of Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR, even if
the actual abuse occurs extra-territorially and at the hands of another
state.143
Evidence concerning the involvement of the British security services in events leading up to the detention of Bisher Al-Rawi and Jamil El
Banna, uncovered after the Court of Appeal proceedings, led Edward
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Davey, a Member of Parliament, to allege that the “British secret services were utterly complicit in the arrest and rendition of Bisher and Jamil.”144 On the basis of this evidence, and bolstered by the progress in
the Mohamed case, these former detainees, together with Richard Belmar, Omar Deghayes, Moazzam Begg, Binyan Mohamed and Martin
Mubanga, instituted a claim for damages as a result of the collusion of
the British Government in their detention. 145 In an initial judgment in the
case, the Mr. Justice Silber accepted that the government can use “closed
evidence,” presented by security cleared special advocates, in hearings
closed to the claimants and general public, in response to this action. 146
Mr. Justice Silber did, however, note that “[t]he Judge conducting a
closed material procedure with the assistance of a special advocate acting
for the claimant would be carefully scrutinizing whether any documents
for which [Public Interest Immunity] has been claimed should be disclosed to the claimants‟ open advocate.”147
V. CONCLUSION
Despite President Barak Obama‟s announcement on January 22,
2009, of the planned closure of the Camp Delta detention facility in
Guantánamo Bay148 and the release of most of the British residents as
charted in this article, the litigation surrounding Guantánamo in the English legal system continues to gather pace. This article has indicated that,
to date, there have been two important “ripple effects” from the detentions at Guantánamo evident in litigation before the English courts.
Firstly, judicial review actions have been employed to press the
British Government to adopt a more active stance in opposition to the detentions in Guantánamo Bay. In the earlier Guantánamo cases, when evidence did not directly link the United Kingdom to the detention and
treatment of individuals, many judges endorsed this aim by the exercise
of “soft power” rather than ruling against the British Government. Even
though the British Government won these cases, headline-grabbing
statements on the arbitrary detention and ill treatment of those individuals detained in Guantánamo set the tone of public debate. More recently,
the tenacity of the Divisional Court judges hearing the Mohamed case
drew an exasperated response from Jonathan Sumption, QC, representing
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the Foreign Secretary in the Government‟s appeal against their order to
disclose the redacted material in their judgments. Before the Court of
Appeal he argued that the position adopted by Lord Justice Thomas and
Mr. Justice Lloyd Jones was “in many respects unnecessary and profoundly damaging to the interests of this country.”149 The Divisional
Court‟s reason for demanding the publication of this information relates
directly to its importance in potentially revealing the complicity of the
United Kingdom in torture:
“In our view . . . a vital public interest requires, for reasons of democratic
accountability and the rule of law in the United Kingdom, that a summary
of the most important evidence relating to the British security services in
wrongdoing be placed in the public domain in the United Kingdom.”150

Secondly, where serious human rights abuses are at issue, the
English courts have shown a willingness to disregard historic conceptions of comity between the courts of different jurisdictions and to assert
their view of the correct interpretation of law for the benefit of the appellate courts in the United States.151 In the Abbasi case, for example, with
United States Government maintaining that the detention of prisoners at
Guantánamo was lawful, and with the issue still live before the federal
courts, the British Government argued that the issue was not justiciable
before the Court of Appeal. 152 Lord Phillips, however, rejected the application of this principle of comity given the seriousness of the human
rights abuses which were at issue, proceeding on the basis that Abbasi
was being held “in apparent contravention of fundamental principles recognized by both jurisdictions and by international law.” 153
Both trends, evident throughout the Guantánamo litigation examined in this article, highlight the importance of these cases as part of
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the jurisprudence of the English courts after the Human Rights Act.
However, it is one thing for these courts to attempt to maneuver the British Government into protecting the interests of detainees, or to seek to
influence their fellow judges in the United States. As the Guantánamo
cases involving claims for diplomatic protection have shown, such exercises of “soft power” may take years to have an effect, and it may prove
difficult to discern the impact of the judiciary‟s position as separate from
other influences on decision making. The ongoing litigation will require
the English courts to assess whether the British Government was complicit in the detention and torture of detainees, in circumstances where only
a direct decision will suffice. This might require the English courts to
reach uncomfortable decisions with an impact which is very close to
home. 154
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